US Patent:
20070011080, Jan 11, 2007
Inventors:
Rahul Jain - Berkeley CA, US
Charis Kaskiris - Kensington CA, US
Pravin Varaiya - Berkeley CA, US
Jun Shu - State College PA, US
Ram Rajagopal - Berkeley CA, US
Nisha Pillai - San Francisco CA, US
Assignee:
The Regents of the University of California - Oakland CA
International Classification:
G06Q 40/00
Abstract:
A system and method for implementing a double-sided exchange. In an illustrative embodiment, the double-sided exchange may be an exchange wherein both buyers and sellers provide bids for matching via the exchange. A first interface receives one or more buy bids from one or more buyers and a second interface receives one or more sell bids from one or more sellers. A controller matches the one or more sell bids with the one or more buy bids, yielding one or more matched buy bids and one or more matched sell bids in response thereto so that allocations of the matched one or more buy bids and the one or more matched sell bids maximize a surplus of the exchange. Certain embodiments of the present invention may provide an allocation that substantially maximizes an auctioneer's profit and/or announces payments based on one or more sell bids. The announced allocations and prices can be shown to be a substantially competitive equilibrium in some applications.